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FEDERAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
IN DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
By Arnold C. Wegher*
INTRODUCTION
Divorce is a matter of significant public and private concern. Over
the past fifty years in the United States, the divorce rate has steadily in-
creased. In 1900, A% of the male population was divorced. In 1963,
2.1%o of the male population was divorced. This compares with .5%
for females in 1900 and 2.9% in 1963. The rate of increase shows no
indication of slowing down.
Evidence indicates that the husband is most often the one who wishes
to get out of the marriage. It is likely, however, that in about 60% of
the cases, divorce was first suggested by the wife. The husband, con-
sciously or unconsciously, merely makes himself so obnoxious that his
wife is willing to be the moving party in seeking the divorce.2
Few lawyers and even fewer accountants appreciate the tax consequences
of divorce. There are good reasons for this. Usually when a man (or
woman) wants a divorce he doesn't go to his accountant, likewise he
doesn't go to a lawyer who specializes in tax. He goes to a man he con-
siders to be one of the fighting lawyers--a litigation man. Little does he
realize, of course, that his great fighting champion will likely assign the
case to the most junior man in the office. Divorce cases are a fertile
training ground for the young lawyers interested in litigation. He learns
how to get people in and out of jail, procure restraining orders, and ob-
*B.M.E. 1953, Marquette University; LL.B. 1961, University of Colorado;
LL.M. 1962, New York University; Ford Foundation Law Teacher Fellow, 1961-
62, New York University; Member, Colorado, Denver and American Bar Asso-
ciations; Partner in law firm of Hindry, Erickson & Meyer of Denver, Colorado.
This article is an abbreviated version of a research paper which will be submitted
by the author in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Juridicial Science at New York University School of Law. It is published here
with the approval of the Committee on Graduate Studies at New York University.
1 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, Table 29, Page 31 (1964).2 GOODE, AFnm DivoRcE 114-37 (The Free Press, 1956).
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tain injunctions. He soon becomes exposed to the numerous telephone
calls and wet nursing that is required.
Seldom does this young lawyer call on an accountant for assistance.
Usually, he is afraid to do so for fear of admitting there is something
he doesnit know, or maybe he doesnt know enough to do so, or maybe
he doesn't have enough authority. Seldom does this young gladiator call
on his fellow tax lawyer. Usually, if he needs help, he calls on his liti-
gation friends. However, even if he did call on his fellow tax lawyer
or accountant, he might not get much help. The tax lawyer and ac-
countant are concerned about deductions and credits, spin offs and split
ups, organizations and reorganizations, gains and losses, carry overs
and carry backs, basis, depreciation, etc. They spend their time servicing
their great and wealthy corporate client. In truth, few "tax lawyers"
handle divorce cases and few "divorce lawyers" handle tax matters.
Many learned authors have addressed themselves to the problem
of divorce and its consequences in a social light. They have concerned
themselves with problems of reform and the like. Few, however, have dealt
with the tax problem. This is not surprising. Ordinarily, the law pro-
fessor who teaches the subject of domestic relations in the law school
does not also teach. the tax course. The likelihood is that he knows very
little about tax and desires to avoid it like the plague, hoping beyond
hope that whatever important matters there are, aside from the de-
ductibility of alimony payments, will be handled by the "tax man." On
the other hand, the "tax man" is busy teaching about the "fruit and tree,"
whose income it is, when it is income, and the like. He knows little
about divorce law and spends as little time as possible discussing taxa-
tion with respect to it.
At the onset of divorce, the husband and wife both must realize
that there will be increases in the joint expenses. This hardly seems
like a rational solution in those numerous divorce cases in which fi-
nancial problems are said to be at the heart of things. It is unlikely
there will be any increase in income to offset this increased cost of run-
ning the separated home, unless it is resolved by the wife obtaining
outside employment. To further compound the financial problems in-
volved, more than 80% of the people once divorced get remarried.3
Everybody, however, does know a few things about the tax consequences
of divorce. The tax lawyer, the litigation lawyer, the accountant, and even
the parties involved know that, once the parties are divorced, alimony
payments made by the husband to the wife are usually deductible by the
husband and taxable by the wife. It is at this point then that we begin
consideration of the problem.
3 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of thc
United States, Table 29, Page 31 (1964).
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DfERMINATION AND EFFECT OF STATUS
For the purpose of ascertaining the applicability of the Internal Revenue
Code provisions relating to alimony and separate maintenance payments,
the status of the taxpayers is determined at the end of the calendar year.4
If, at that time, the divorce decree is final, the parties are considered to
have been unmarried for the entire year. They may no longer take ad-
vantage of any tax benefits which inure to the benefit of the married
people. If the divorce is not final, but the parties are nevertheless sep-
arated and living apart or separated under an interlocutory decree of di-
vorce, they have the option of either filing separate returns or filing
jointly. If the parties are living apart under a written separation agree-
ment and elect to file separate returns, or are actually divorced, payments
made and received are considered principally under Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, Sections 71, 215, and 682.5 Once divorced, a man can no longer
claim his ex-wife as an exemption even though he may provide 100% of
her support.8
Payments made and actions taken in good faith under decrees which
turn out to be invalid are generally treated as if the parties were, in fact,
divorced.7 The uncertainty which existed in- this area for many years was
cleared up by two recent Second Circuit decisions.
In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner,8 the husband obtained an ex parte
Mexican divorce and then remarried. His first wife brought suit in New
York and had the Mexican divorce declared invalid, leaving her the legal
spouse. The Commissioner upheld by the Tax Court then stepped in to
deny the alimony deduction, the right to file a joint return with the sec-
ond wife, and all the dependency deductions taken for the second
wife, her children, and her parents. The Second Circuit, however,
held that in the interests of uniformity and recognition of congressional
intent, the Mexican divorce should be given effect for federal tax pur-
poses. The court pointed out that it was not passing on the question
where the state which granted the divorce declared it invalid, or where
the rendering court's concept of divorce was entirely alien to that con-
templated by the tax laws.9
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, SS 143, 153.
5 In order to take advantage of the § 215 deduction, however, all deductions
must be itemized. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, SS 62, 63, 141.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152 (because wife does not bear the prescribed
relationship). See also Dale E. Sharp, 15 T.C. 185 (1950).
7/ But see Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962) where the divorce was "void."
8349 F.2d 666, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9592 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'g 40 T.C.
1001 (1963).
9 Prior to the Borax case there was only one clear appellate decision in point.
This was Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1952) where the
court stated: "The mere fact that the marital domicile of the parties did not rec-
ognize the Florida divorce does not render it a nullity for Federal tax purposes."
1966)
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In Wondsel v. Commissioner,10 the taxpayer secured an ex parte Florida
divorce and remarried twice before his first wife had the divorce declared
invalid by a New York court. The payments to both prior wives were
*held to be deductible alimony.
The tax effect of an annulment depends on local law. If the decree of
annulment makes the marriage void ab initio, payments made (whether
or not by court order) will not qualify as alimony or separate mainte-
nance.11 On the other hand, if the local law treats an annulment the same
as a divorce for purposes of imposing the support obligation, payments
made may qualify under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sections 71 and
215.12
The termination of a voidable marriage, such as one induced by fraud,
should be treated the same as any other annulment.
STATUTORY SCHEME FOR ALIMONY
1. Development of the Law
Shortly after the adoption of the income tax law, the United States
Supreme Court determined that alimony payments should not be con-
sidered income to the recipient.'3 It also concluded that there was, there-
fore, no reasonable basis for payor to deduct the alimony. 4 The result
was that the husband had to ante up his alimony from after tax income.
An attempt by a husband to transfer the tax to his ex-wife by having
the alimony paid from a trust also failed.15 Taxwise, the payments were
merely treated as a discharge of husband's general support obligation.'"
In those early days it didn't matter too much since income tax rates
were in the 7% and 8% area, deductions liberal, loopholes plentiful, and
enforcement machinery not nearly so sophisticated as it is now. In the
late 1930's, however, with the oncoming of World War II, tax rates in-
creased substantially, and along with them the difficulties involved in
paying alimony from after tax dollars. In 1942 our legislators in Congress
(perhaps with some alimony obligations themselves and, therefore, not
unmindful of the difficulty involved) adopted a substantial change with
10 350 F.2d 339, 65-2 U.S. Tas Cas. 5 9597 (2d Cir. 1965) rev'g Harold E.
Wondsel, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1399 (1964). Cert. app'd for December 23, 1965.
11 Special Ruling December 8, 1944, 454 CCH 5 6092.
12 Rev. Rul. 59-130, 1959-1 CUm. BULL. 61; Lily R. Reighley, 17 T.C. 344
(1951).
13 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). It is worth noting that the Gould
case cast some general doubt on the constitutionality of taxing alimony. The doubt
has, however, now been removed. See Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285
(Ct. C1. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978 (1950), reh. denied, 340 U.S. 847(1950).
14 Ibid.
15 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
16Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940); Douglas v. Willcuts, supra.
note 15.
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TAX-DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
respect to the tax treatment of alimony and support payments. Such
payments were made deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife
if they were made pursuant to a divorce or separation decree or under a
written instrument incident to divorce or separation.17 Trust income was
made taxable to the wife to the extent used to satisfy the husband's ali-
mony obligation.' s
Although the change in the law was a substantial improvement and
established a greater tax equity, there were some things left to be desired.
To qualify for the new treatment, payments had to be made undek a final
divorce or separation decree.19 In many states, however, a decree does
not become final until a lapse of time after the court hands it down.
Thus, payments made under interlocutory decrees, alimony pendente lite,
payments under a separation agreement, etc., all fell outside the scope of
the statute and were not deductible. Payments would also qualify if made
under a written instrument made "incident to" a divorce or separation.20
These words were imprecise and productive of a large number of dis-
putes.2 1
2. The New Law and Its Improvements
The present provisions in the law have been with us since 1954. Sec-
tion 71 of the 1954 Code provides rules for the treatment of payments
in the nature of, or in lieu of, alimony, or an allowance for support be-
tween spouses who are divorced or separated. Section 215 provides rules
relative to the deduction by husband of periodic payments not attributable
to transferred property. These sections, together with Section 682, which
provides for the treatment of trusts, went a long way toward resolving
the difficulties encountered in administering the 1939 Code.
(a) Principal Changes
The 1954 Code accomplished two principal improvements. First: -It
made periodic sums that the husband paid to his ex-wife for her support
under a support or maintenance decree granted after March 1, 1954, de-
17 INT. R.v. CODE OF 1939, §§ 22(k), 23(u).18 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 171.
19INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(k), 23(u).
20 Ibid.2 E.g., MacFadden v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1957); Holt -v.
Commissioner, 226 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1955); Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d
296 (2d Cir. 1952); Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir: 1952);
Smith v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Blum,
187 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.
1949); Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 978 (1950); Drake v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. N.Y. 1961);
Portfolio v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 367 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Bertha McKay Pease,
26 T.C. 749 (1956); Maurice Fixler, 25 T.C. 1313 (1956); Frances Hamer
Johnson, 21 T.C. 371 (1953); Rowena S. Barnum, 19 T.C. 401 (1952); Jane
C. Grant, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952); Miriam Cooper Walsh, 11 T.C. 1093 (1948),
a! 'd, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Hollander v. Commissioner, 248
F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957).
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ductible by him and taxable to her provided, however, that they were
separated and did not file a joint returnm22
Second: It substantially eliminated the problem of determining whether
the agreement, under which the payments were made, was incident to a
divorce or separation decree by providing that payments made under a
written separation agreement executed after August 10, 1954, are de-
ductible by the husband and taxed to the wife, whether or not the agree-
ment is enforceable or the parties are subsequently divorced or obtain a
decree of separation. 23
(b) Present Requirements
For separations and divorces subsequent to August 16, 1954, there is
no longer any real need to draw any distinction between payments which
are characterized as alimony, support or separate maintenance. Such pay-
ments are deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife if:
1. They are made to satisfy a legal obligation imposed on the husband
because of the marital or family relationship.
2 4
2. The husband and wife are either divorced or separated.25
3. The husband and wife do not file a joint return. 26
4. The payments are made pursuant to either:
(a) A divorce decree2 7
(b) Any type of legal decree for separate maintenance.2 8
(c) A support decree.2 9
(d) A written separation agreement.30
5. The payments are made subsequent to the decree or agreement.3 '
6. The payments are "periodic" as that term has been defined in the
statutes, regulations, and cases32
2 2 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 71(a) (3).
23 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 5 71(a) (2).
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5§ 71, 215. In H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 72 (1942), the Ways and Means Committee stated: "This section applies
only where the legal obligation being discharged arises out of the family or marital
relationship in recognition of the general obligation of support made specific by
the decree." See also S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942). See also
Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954); Alice L. Heath, 30 T.C. 339
(1958), aff'd per curiam, 265 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1959).2 5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §5 71, 215.
26 Ibid.2 7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 71(a) (1).
28 Ibid.
29rINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a) (3).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a) (2).
31 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a) (1)-(3); Florence Korman, 36 T.C. 654(1961), af'd per curiam, 298 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1962); cl. Ruth W. Cooper, 31
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1313 (1962)32 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71; Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (1) (1958);
F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T.C. 211 (1953).
[Vol. 3, No. 2
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(c) Agreements Made Before 1954 but Modified Thereafter
If the payments are made under a written separation agreement executed
prior to August 16, 1954, they are neither deductible by the husband nor
taxable to the wife. If, however, the agreement has been altered in writing
in any material respect after that date, it will thereafter qualify for the
alimony deduction. 3
Payments made under a support decree, like payments under a written
separation agreement, were not deductible by the husband or income to
the wife under the 1939 Code. In the support decree area, however, March
1, 1954, is now the magic date. Payments made under a decree entered on
or before that date do not qualify for treatment under the 1954 Code.
Post March 1, 1954, modification, however, will bring the decree under
the new lawP
4
(d) The Requirement of a Legal Obligation
-.The question of whether or not there is a legal obligation will nor-
mally be decided under local law. In the ordinary case, the local law
imposes an obligation upon the husband or ex-husband to provide suffi-
cient funds, consistent with his means, to his estranged wife or ex-wife
in order to provide for her support and maintenance. Under some spe-
cial circumstances, i.e. if the husband is physically or mentally incapac-
itated, the local law may even impose a support obligation upon the
wife.35 Repayment of a debt to an ex-wife is not an obligation rising out
of the family relationship, but rather is a business transaction which does
not come into the purview of the alimony provisions.
36
There is at least a possibility that where periodic payments exceed the
amounts required for the wife's support, the excess over the amount re-
quired for support constitutes a gift.37 It seems clear then that amounts
paid by the husband to the wife, or vice versa, to buy the other off, do
not qualify as alimony.
(e) The Requirement of a Written Agreement
Alimony pendente lite or other support payments made pursuant to
3 3 Treas. Reg. S 1.71-1(b) (2) (1958); Rev. Rul. 56-418, 1956-2 CuM. BULL.
27. Although August 19, 1954 is quite a while ago, cases still come up concern-
ing pre-195 4 modification. For example, H. Gregory Shea, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1223 (1965 involved the question of whether or not modification made two
weeks after August 16, 1954, which changed the weekly payments to semimonthly
payments, was material enough to qualify under the language of the regulations.
The Tax Court decided it was not.34 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (b) (ii) (1958).35 No doubt the Congress contemplated a situation where the wife might be
paying alimony to the husband. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (17).36 Thorsness v. United States, 260 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1958); Miriam Finley
Schwartz, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 509 (1954); J. H. England, 37 T.C. 1150 (1962);
Jerome Blate, 34 T.C. 121 (1960); John Sidney Thompson, 22 T.C. 275 (1954);
Thomas E. Hoag, 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
37 E.T. 19, 146-2 CuM. BULL. 166.
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an oral agreement of the parties will not be taxed under Section 71 or be
deductible under Section 215. To qualify, the payments must be made
after the execution of a written agreement or pursuant to an order of
the court s
(f) The Periodic Payment Requirement
The requirement of periodic payments may be satisfied in a number of
different ways:
(i) The payment is periodic if it is indefinite in either or both amount
to be paid and the period over which it is to be paid and is in the nature
of alimony or support;3 9 or
(ii) The payment is periodic if it is a definite amount payable over
more than 10 years.40
Some examples of periodic payments are as follows:
Payment from husband to wife to terminate upon death or remarriage
of wife4 1
Payment from husband to wife to terminate upon death of husband.4 2
Payment from husband to wife, termination of which is not specified
but which, under local law, may be modified or will terminate upon
death of either spouse.43
Payment from husband to wife for a fixed period of less than 10 years
but subject to the contingencies set forth above 44
Payment from husband to wife of a fixed amount payable in install-
ments which are to be paid over a period of more than 10 years from
the date of the decree 45
Payments from husband to wife which are contingent upon either hus-
band's or wife's income.4 6
Payments from husband to wife which are a percentage of husband's
income 4 7
3 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(3).
3 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (1958).40 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c) (2).
4 1 Edward Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 203 F.2d 715 (2d
Cir. 1953).42 Smith v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
48Laurence J. Ellert, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 407 (1961), af 'd, 311 F.2d 707(6th Cir. 1962); Paul Shawhan, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 98 (1963).44 Rev. Rul. 59-45, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 666; Bettye W. Hobbs 32 P-H Tax
Ct Mem. 16 (1963); Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953),
reversing on this pojnt, 17 T.C. 1610 (1952), where the decree provided that the
wife was to receive $300 per month for one year and $200 per month for the
next five year, but if she should die or remarry within that time, the payments
would cease.45 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71 (c) (2).4 0 Ronald Keith Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948); John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834(1948).47 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (i) (a) (1958).
[Vol. 3, No. 2
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Periodic payments need not be made at regular intervals. They are
simply payments made at different times and from time to time and may
be of definite or indefinite amount or duration. The payments may be in
cash or kind and may be made directly to the wife or may be paid to
third persons in payment for goods or services supplied to the wife.48
(g) Installment Payments v. Periodic Payments
Periodic payments must be distinguished from installment payments,
which are specifically excluded from treatment as alimony.49 Generally,
installment payments are payments made from time to time, either of
equal or unequal amount, which are applied to discharge an obligation,
the principal sum of which is definitely fixed in the decree or other-
wise. 0 The only exception from the installment payment rule is where
the principal sum may be or is to be paid within a period ending more
than 10 years after the date of the decree or execution of the agreement
under which the payments are made.51
If, under the terms of the divorce or separation decree or separation
agreement, the husband may discharge the principal obligation by mak-
ing payments over the 10 year period, the payments are deductible.52 The
principal obligation may, in fact, be discharged in less than 10 years but,
so long as the decree permits discharge in more than 10 years, the pay-
ments may be considered periodic.5 3 In cases where the obligation is
satisfied in less than 10 years, the amount which is treated as a periodic
payment is limited to 10% of the principal sum. 54 The 10% limitation,
however, applies only to advance payments. Delinquent payments retain
their character even though, when paid, the amount may be more than
10% of the total due. 5
STATUTORY SCHEME FOR ALIMONY TRUSTS
1. Section 71 Trfusts
When a husband sets up a trust to provide for the alimony payments
instead of making them directly, the applicable code provisions are slightly
4SAline S. Fisher, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1956); Robert Lehman, 17
T.C. 652 (1951); Mary MacFadden, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1221 (1956), aff'd,
250 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1957); ef. Smith v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.
1953).49 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c) (1).
50Treas. Reg. 5 1.71-1(d) (3) (ii) (b), (c) (1950); Ralph Norton, 16 T.C.
1216 (1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 960 (8dth Cir. 1951).
51 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c) (2).
52 Ibi.
53 llert v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1962); Alice Grabowski,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 284 (1962).
54 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (2) 1958).
55Ibid.; Antoinette L Holahan, 21 T.C. 451 (1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1955); Jane C. Grant, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952), afl'd, 209 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1953); Sarah L. Noresckkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950), aff'd per cariam, 189 F.2d
257 (2d Cir. 1951).
19661
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different. Before the 1942 amendments, income from alimony trusts had
been taxed to the husband.5 6 The 1942 act 57 provided that trust distribu-
dons would be taxed to the wife rather than to the husband to the extent
used to satisfy the husband's alimony obligation. Since the distribution is
not included in the husband's income, there is no need for any provision
allowing him to deduct the amounts paid.58
The full amount of periodic payments paid by the trust to satisfy the
alimony obligation is taxable to the wife, regardless of whether the pay-
ments are made from trust income or corpusP9 The Grantor Trust Rules, 0
which would otherwise cause the income to be taxed to the husband be-
cause it is used to discharge his support obligation, are not applicable.0'
Ordinarily, the trust conduit rule provides that trust income in the
hands of the beneficiary retains the same character it had in the hands of
the trustee.62 For example, capital gains and tax exempt income received
by the trust retain the same character in the hands of the beneficiary. This
is not so where a trust is established to satisfy a support obligation im-
posed by a divorce or separation. In the latter case, Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, Section 71 (a) makes all of the distributions taxable to the wife
as ordinary income, whether the trustee received it as capital gain or in-
come on tax exempt securities.
3
2. Section 682 Trusts
To this point, we have been considering trusts which have been estab-
lished for the specific purpose of providing the payments required by a
separation agreement or divorce or separation decree. Such payments are
taxed to the wife under Section 71. Where a trust was created before the
divorce or separation and not in contemplation of it, Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Section 682 applies. This section supplements the pro-
visions of Section 71 and provides that any trust income to which a wife
is entitled because of a separation agreement or a divorce or separation
decree, and which would otherwise be taxed to the husband, shall be
56Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
57 INT REv. CODE OF 1939, § 171.58 Such as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 215 in the case of direct periodic pay-
ments.5 0 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c) (3) (1958).60 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 673-77.
6 1Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(3) (1958).62 INT. REV. CODE 1954, 5§ 652(b), 661(b).
63 See, Muriel Dodge Newman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956); Anita Quinby Stewart,
9 T.C. 195 (1947). Now and again separation agreements have been drawn which
provide that the husband is also to pay the wife's taxes. To counter this, the hus-
band's lawyer may try to satisfy the alimony obligation by providing that payments
are to be made from a trust, the corpus of which is to be tax exempt securities.
To the knowledge of the author, the Internal Revenue Service has uniformly as-
serted that the receipts by the wife are taxable as ordinary income regardless of
the source.
10
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taxed to the wife. The important distinction between a Section 71 trust
and a Section 682 trust is that under Section 682 payments are included
in the wife's income only to the extent they are made out of trust dis-
tributable net income.6 4
If the husband assigns his interest in a trust already in existence to his
wife pursuant to divorce or separation decree or separation agreement,
the trust immediately comes under Section 71 (a). 65
3. Examples
The following examples illustrates the application of Sections 71 and
682 (a):
Example L Husband transfers $100,000 to a trust fund for his
wife for her support pursuant to a property settlement agree-
ment made in connection with their divorce. The trust is to
pay the wife $10,000 per year from income and principal. The
entire $10,000 is taxed to the wife under Section 71 regardless
of whether it's from income or corpus.
Example II. Husband transfers $100,000 to a trust for his
wife 10 years before the divorce and not in contemplation
thereof. Under local law the husband has an obligation to sup-
port his ex-wife. The wife continues as beneficiary after the
divorce. Section 682 relieves the husband from the Grantor
Trust Rules (which would otherwise tax the income to the hus-
band) and taxes income to the wife. If the wife receives dis-
tribution of corpus, she is not taxed on it. Capital gains and
tax exempt income received by the trust and distributed to the
wife retain the same character in her hands.
Example III. Grandfather tranfers $100,000 to a trust for his
grandson and his wife upon their marriage, the income and
principal to be distributed to either of them according to tht
trustee's discretion '(sprinkle power). Three years later, upon
divorce, the grandson assigns all his interest in the trust to the
wife in satisfaction of the support obligation. The income is all
taxed to the wife under Section 71. It is not clear how the dis-
tribution of principal would be handled. Most likely it would
be handled under Section 71, since the assignment of all the
husband's interest comes under Section 71.6sa
4. Other Trust Considerations
(a) Trust for child support.
Whether the trust is a Section 71 trust or a Section 682 trust, the in-
come is taxed to the husband to the extent that the trust instrument (or
04 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 682(a).
6 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.682 (a)-1(a) (2) (1958). But see Anita Quimby Stewart,
supra note 63658 But see Anita Quinby Stewart, supra note 63.
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divorce or separation decree or separation agreement) directs it to be
used for the support of the husband's minor children.as
(b) Gain on transfer to trust.
There may also be a capital gain to the husband if he transfers appre-
ciated property to the trust. In Commissioner v. MestaOT for example,
the husband traisferred appreciated securities as part of a property settle-
ment incident to a divorce. He was held taxable on the excess of the fair
market value of the securities over the cost basis, the court finding the
consideration to be the discharge of the support obligation and deter-
mining the latter to be equal to the fair market value of the securities
given up. The husband, however, will not realize taxable income upon
the transfer of appreciated securities to a trust for the benefit of his di-
vorced wife unless the trust terminates his support obligation under the
divorce settlement.68 If the trust terminates the obligation in part, the
husband must realize taxable income on the aliquot part of the appre-
ciated value of the property transferred.
6 9
(c) Estate tax problems with a trust.
There are no special estate tax provisions in the 1954 Code providing
relief to the estate of a husband who has transferred property into a trust
for his ex-wife's support, but who has retained a reversionary interest in
it. The situation is governed by the Internal Revenue Code, 1954, Sections
2036, 2037, and 2038, which apply in both divorce and nondivorce
settings.
In the usual case, an alimony trust is set up to terminate upon the
death or remarriage of the ex-wife. If the instrument provides that the
then corpus of the trust is at that time to revert to the husband or his
estate, the husband has made a transfer with a reversionary interest which
will be included in his taxable estate at death, whether or not it has, in
fact, reverted to him. ° Even an irrevocable trust for the support of minor
children may be subject to estate tax on the husband's death, since the
trust income might be deemed to satisfy the husband's legal obligation.7 '
The theory is that if the income is used to satisfy the husband's legal
obligation, it is the same as if he received it and used it in that manner.712
66 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 682(a); Walter L Ferris, 1 T.C. 992 (1943);
Calvin H. Sugg, 1 T.C. 431 (1943)67 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1941). See also
Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'g 44 B.T.A. 740(1941), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958).68 Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 65.69 Rev. Rul 57-507, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 511; Rev. Rul. 59-47, 1959-1 CuM.
BuLL. 198.7 0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 2037.
I 1 See INT. REv. CoD)E OF 1954, § 2036; Commissioner v. Dwight, 205 F.2d
298 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871 (1953).
713 Cf. Old Colony Trust Co v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
[Vol. 3, No. 2
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 3 [1966], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol3/iss2/2
TAX-DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
(d) Other arrangements may be better
Considering the adverse and potentially adverse tax consequences, an
alimony trust should only be used in very limited circumstances. If the
concern is over the dependability of the ex-husband to make the pay-
ments, an escrow or other security arrangement will do better and result
in less adverse tax consequences.
2
Life insurance can be used to protect against the husband's death, if
this is a concern.7 3
Perhaps only when the wife's competency is so seriously in doubt that
she cannot be relied upon to properly use or handle property, which
would otherwise be received outright, should the trust be used. But even
then, its purpose should not be only to provide the alimony payments,
but rather to comprise a part of the lifetime estate planning of the wife
and provide a means to conserve her property.
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
1. Income Tax Consequences of the Transfer of Separately Owned
Property
(a) Amount Realized
A transfer by a husband in exchange for a total or partial release of
his ex-wife's right of support is a taxable transaction.7 4 If the husband's
basis in the property he transfers is less than its fair market value, he
realizes a gain which may be either ordinary or capital. The amount of
the gain which must be recognized is equal to the difference between
the fair market value of the property and the husband's basis. 5 The wife's
new basis in the property she receives is its fair market value, and her
holding period begins when she receives the property.7 6
If the fair market value is less than the husband's basis, no loss is
allowed on the transfer because it is not a transaction entered into for
profit.
7 8
The statute which deals with the recognition of gain provides that
"the amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the sum of money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received. '78 (Emphasis added.)
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Davis79 estab-
lished that the value of the property the husband receives is deemed to
72See Tilles v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 703 (1940).
73 Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); Baker v. Com-
missioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T.C.
1356 (1950).
74 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 55 1001, 1002; Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d
168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd., 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
7r, Davis v. United States, supra note 74.
76 Cf. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cit. 1947).
77INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 165(c), 267(a) (1). See also Edward A.
Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
79 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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be equal to the value of the property he transfers. Davis was heard by the
Supreme Court because of a conflict in the circuits and in the Court of
Claims. The rule in the Second and Third Circuits had been the same
as in Davis.80 The Sixth Circuit rule, which was followed by the Court of
Claims, was different. 81 The Sixth Circuit, in Marshman, (which ap-
peared to be a very well reasoned case), said:
"Section 111 (b), (the Internal Revenue Code of 1939), re-
quires that the capital gain be measured by the fair market
value of the property ... received' by the taxpayer, not by the fair
market value of the property transferred by the taxpayer in
exchange for the property received. To say that the fair market
value of the property received is the same as the fair market value
of the property given up, not only ignores realities, but is the
use of a formula which is radically different from the well
established and well recognized formula approved by the courts
for determining fair market value ...
Unfortunately, it is often the case that what a husband trans-
fers to his wife in a so-called property settlement in a pending
divorce action is not given merely in exchange for a release
of alimony and dower rights, but also includes, without being
so labeled, such additional amount as the husband may be
willing to pay in order to have the marital status terminted...
the value of what is given up is no criterion of the fair market
value of the property received 8 2
The Court of Claims thought Marshman stated the best rule, applied
in it Davis, but was (and perhaps unfortunately) reversed by the Supreme
Court.83
(b) Effect of Encumbrances
The amount realized by the husband in the transfer of property in a
divorce or legal separation is not reduced by any encumbrances on the
property.84 This is true whether or not the encumbrance is assumed. Either
way, it is considered to be part of what the husband receives.8 t If the
wife doesn't assume, payments on any encumbrance are either additional
property settlement or, if they meet the periodic payment test, additional
alimony. 86
80 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
695 (1942); Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958).
SlHomer H. Marshman, 31 T.C. 269 (1958), revd on other grounds, 279
F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied on taxpayers application, 364 U.S. 918(1960).8 2 Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir. 1960).83 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
84 E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958).
85 Ibid.
86 See pages 120 and 121 supra; see also Renstram v. United States, 220 F. Supp
688 (D. Neb. 1963); Klemm v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9906 (E.D.
Wis. 1957); Edmund D. Steelman, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 365 (1959) (all non-
deductible); Mace v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9732 (S.D. Cal. 1964)
(deductible); Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 17.
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To illustrate the law, assume the following fact situation:
The husband owns an apartment building in which his ad-
justed basis is $50,000. The property is encumbered in the
amount of $61,000, and its fair market value is $80,000. Pur-
suant to a divorce decree, the husband transfers this building to
his ex-wife for the relinquishment of her right of support. The
husband also agrees to continue to pay the mortgage. The prin-
cipal of the mortgage is being repaid at the rate of $6,000 per
year, with annual interest of $500, taxes of $500, and insurance
of $500, making the total annual payment $7,500. On the trans-
fer the husband's gain is $30,000, being the difference between
the fair market value of $80,000 and his adjusted basis of
$50,000.
To the extent that the husband continues to pay the mort-
gage payments, they qualify as alimony, since they are payable
over a period of longer than 10 years from the date of the
decree.8 7 The husband gets to deduct $7,500 (the whole pay-
ment) per year, and the wife must include the same amount
in her taxable income. The ex-wife can probably deduct the
taxes paid, but there is a serious question as to her right to
deduct the interest, since the interest is not an obligation of hers
but is rather the husband's obligation. If the wife had as-
sumed the mortgage and the husband had paid her $7,500 per
year alimony so she could make the mortgage payments, there
would be no question about her right to the deduction.8
(c) Wife's Basis in Support Rights
There is no law establishing what the wife's basis is in the suport rights
that she gives up to get the property. Presumably, she is not taxed on
what she parts with.89
2. Income Tax Consequences of the Transfer of Jointly Owned Property
(a) Division on the Basis of Ownership Interest
A division which recognizes the parties' ownership interests is tax
free. 0 There may be tracing problems to find what the ownership interest
of each is, but even if item by item tracing cannot be done, .it will be
sufficient if the taxpayers can show that each contributed a like amount
to the basic purchase price of the property which is being divided.91
87 See Mace v. United Sattes, supra note 86.88 Having wife assume should not be objectionable to either party, since either
way the whole amount will be deductible by husband and taxable to wife; but if
wife assumes, she gets the interest deduction; but see Rev. Rul. 58-52, 1958-1
CUM. BULL. 15, as modified by Rev. Rul. 62-38, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL. 15;
Deininger v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963).89 See note 76 supra.
9 0 Edward A. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935); Ann Y. Oliver, 18 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 347 (1949); Rev. Rul. 56-437.
91Dee Davenport, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mern. 778 (1953); Osceola Heard Daven-
port, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 779 (1953).
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(b) Division Partly on Ownership Basis
If the division recognizes part of the party's ownership interest, it will
be treated like a sale or exchange only to the extent that it doesn't recog-
nize the ownership interest.92 For example, if the husband and wife had
contributed equally to the purchase of a $20,000 home and held title to
that home jointly and on divorce this home was transferred to the wife,
it would be treated like a sale to the extent of the part owned by the
husband and the recognition of the ownership interest of the wife to the
extent of the part of the home which was purchased by her contribution.
The wife's basis would be carried over on her allocable share and in-
creased on the part received from her husband to the fair market value
on the date that she received it.93 To illustrate the application of this
splitting the basis provision, consider the following fact situation:
Husband and wife have acquired during their marital life
a motel, the basis of which is $200,000. Each owns one-half
and each contributed a like amount to acquire the motel. Thus,
the basis for the wife, with respect to her share of the motel,
would be $100,000, and the basis to the husband, for his part
of the motel, would be $100,000. Assume that the fair market
value of the motel is $400,000 at the time the parties are di-
vorced. If the husband transferred his interest in the motel to
his wife in exchange for her relinquishment of her support
rights, he would have to recognize a gain of $100,000 on the
transfer, which is the difference between his allocable share of
the basis and his allocable share of the fair market value, to-wit,
$200,000 fair market value share minus $100,000 basis. The
wife's new basis in the property would be $300,000 computed
as follows: $100,000 carry-over basis, (her allocable share of
the total basis), plus $20,000 fair market value of the portion
she received from her husband.
If, in the fact situation above set forth, it was decided to transfer cash
to the wife in exchange for her share of the motel, the wife would, in
fact, have a gain.94 For example, assume that it was decided between the
husband and wife that as part of the property settlement, the husband
would buy out the wife's interest in the motel. In order to do so he would
pay her $200,000 for her interest. At the time he paid the $200,000, the
wife would have a gain of $100,000, which is the difference between the
fair market value and her allocable share of the basis.
3. Estate and Gift Tax Consequences of Property Transfer
(a) Gift Tax
No gift is involved in a property settlement incident to a divorce if:
(i) The transfer is made to satisfy the support obligation,95 or
92 Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947); Johnson v. United
States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).93 Swanson v. Wiseman, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9264 (W.D. Oka. 1961).
94jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954).95 Paul Rosenthal, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 487 (1954).
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(ii) It is incorporated into the divorce decree or is otherwise approved
in the decree of the divorce court.t6
Section 2516 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 gives further gift
tax relief to divorced parties. It provides that:
"Where the husband and wife enter into a written agree-
ment relative to their marital and property rights, and divorce
occurs within two years thereafter (whether or not such agree-
ment is approved by the divorce decree), and transfers of
property or interests in property made pursuant to such agree-
ment-
(1) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or
property rights, or
(2) to provide a reasonable allowance for the support of
issue of the marriage during minority,
shall be deemed to be transfers made for a full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth.'
Relief from the gift tax is also provided in E.T. 19,97 a gift tax release
issued in 1946, which states:
"Transfers of property, pursuant to an agreement incident to
divorce or legal separation, are not made for adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth to the extent that
they are made in consideration of a promised relinquishment
of dower, curtesy or of a statutory estate created in lieu of
dower, curtesy or other marital rights in the transfer or as
property or estate; to the extent that the transfers are made
in satisfaction of support rights, the transfers are held to be
for an adequate and full consideration. The value of relin-
quished support rights shall be ascertained on the basis of the
facts and circumstances of each individual case."
(b) Estate Tax
Unfortunately, income, gift, and estate taxes are not always construed
in pari materia.98 If they were, the gift problem would be resolved by
Davis9 and the estate tax problem would be resolved by E.T. 19.100
There are no special privisions of the estate tax law dealing with the
divorce or separation situation. To qualify as a claim against an estate,
any indebtedness (whether or not in connection with separation or di-
vorce) must be a result of the receipt of adequate and full consideration
96 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); McMurtry v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1959).
97 1946-2 Ctnm. BULL. 166.98 Estate and gift tax are construed in pari nateria: Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S.
308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); but together they
are not construed in pari mnateria with the income tax. Farid-Bs-Sultaneh v. Com-
missioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).99 Davis v. United States, supra note 74.
100 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166.
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in money or money's worth by the decedent before his death. 101 The
relinquishment of dower, curtesy or statutory rights in lieu thereof, or
other marital rights, is not considered adequate and full consideration in
money or moneys worth.10
2
A relinquishment of support and property rights is considered to be
full and adequate consideration, and may, therefore, give rise to a valid
claim against the ex-husband's estate 0 3 If the divorce decree or agree-
ment provides for the support of dependents other than the taxpayer's
wife'.04 or provides for alimony to be paid from the estate, 05 the value
of these payments is ascertained, and they are deductible as a claim against
the ex-husband's estate. Arrearages in support or alimony are also deducti-
ble' 0 6 as well as any other claim founded upon a court order.'07 If the
husband has an agreement incorporated in the divorce decree or separa-
tion agreement to leave part of his estate to his ex-wife or children and
he fails to do so, claims that they make against the estate will be
deductible. 0 8
TREATMENT OF INSURANCE
1. Incidents of Ownership Rule
Life insurance is almost always involved in divorce matters. Usually it
is on the husband's life and is payable on his death to the wife with the
children as contingent beneficiaries. In the usual situation, an agreement
is entered into whereby the husband will keep up the premium payments
and name his wife as the irrevocable beneficiary. Under these circum-
stances, the husband will obtain a deduction for premiums paid, provided
the wife is given all of the incidents of ownership and the husband
retains no rights whatever over the policies.109 If the husband retains any
of the incidents of ownership, he gets no deductions for any premiums
paid, and the proceeds of the policies paid upon his death will be included
in his taxable estate"10
101oNr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) (3), 2053(c) (1), 2043(b), 2034.
102 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043 (b).
10 3 See cases cited supra note 96; E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166.
104 Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940).
105 Yoke v. Fleming, 145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Maresi,
156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Florida Nat'l Bank and Trust v. United States, 182
F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Fla. 1960).
106 Commissioner v. Watson, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954).1 0 7 See cases cited supra note 105.
108 Commissioner v. Watson, supra note 106; Beecher v. United States, 280 F.2d
202 (3d Cit. 1960).1 09 IN. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2); I.T. 4001, 1950-1 CUM. BULL.
27; Ashcraft v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1958).
no See I.T. 4001, supra note 109; Seligman v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489
(7th Cir. 1953); Beulah Wel, 22 T.C. 612 (1954); James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C.
701 (1958); Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965).
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2. Transfer for Value Rule
In the case of a transfer for good and valuable consideration, the trans-
feree may find that she unexpectedly has to include the proceeds of the
life insurance, which are paid on the death of the insured ex-husband,
in her taxable income."' This rule is sometimes referred to as the 'Trans-
fer for Value Rule." It provides that part of the proceeds of the policy
are included in the transferees gross income in the year of receipt. The
amount included is that sum by which the amount of the insurance actu-
ally paid upon the death of the insured exceeds the actual value of the
consideration for the transfer and any premiums subsequently paid by the
transferee."12 (It has been suggested now and then that this is a way for
the husband to get the last laugh.) The following example will illustrate
the rule.
The husband transfers, as part of a property settlement, in-
surance on his life. The Davis "13 case applies, so the wife's
basis or the consideration that the wife gives for the insurance
is the actual cash value at the day of transfer, and here assume
it is $3,000. The wife thereafter pays $2,000 in premiums. The
husband then dies, and the wife collects the face value, which is
$15,000. Ten thousands dollars is ordinary income in to the wife
in the year of receipt. The same result would pertain if the
husband paid all the premiums and the wife had all the in,
cidents of ownership.
The best way to get around this undesirable tax situation is to have
the wife purchase new insurance on the life of her ex-husband (if he is
insurable).
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
1. Payments Made After Divorce or Separation
Payments made for the support of a minor child are specifically ex-
excluded from the alimony treatment provided by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Sections 71 and 215.114 To be excluded, however, the
amount of the payment which is to be used for the child's support must
be definitely fixed by the terms of the decree, instrument or agree-
ment."l r If the only way the support portion may be ascertained is to
look at the reduction in the total amount paid to the wife as each child
dies, marries, reaches the age of 21 or is otherwise emancipated, the whole
payment will be treated as alimony."16 For the payment to be considered
M'INT. Rnv. CODE § 101(a) (2); Treas. Regs. 1.101-1(b) (1).
112 Ibid.
113 Davis v. United States, supra note 74.
"14 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(b), 682(a).
115 Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961); Louise Ross, 33 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 2275 (1964); note also that a minor by definition is a child under the age
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child support, it must be a definitely fixed amount or percentage, specifi-
cally designated for the purpose of supporting the minor children of the
marriage.
The leading case, Commissioner v. Lester,117 is illustrative. Taxpayer
Lester made unitary payments under a written separation agreement to
his ex-wife for her support and the suporpt of their three minor children.
The payments were to be reduced by 1/6 upon the death, marriage or
emancipation of each child. It could be inferred from the agreement that
the parties actually intended 1/2 of the amount paid to be alimony and
the other 1/2 to be for the support of the children during their minority,
and under the earlier decisions, it was likely to be so regarded. The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, held that even though some portion of the payment
was to be used for the support of the minor children, the amount was
not fixed, and fixing in definite terms was a requirement of the statute.
Although the agreement in the Lester case required the amount paid
to be reduced by a fixed percentage upon the emancipation of each of
the children, it did not require any specific amount to be used for the
support of the children. The ex-wife was free to use her own discretion
in allocating the monies received among herself and her children. Such
broad discretion is tantamount to absolute ownership of the payments.11
Subsequently, the Commissioner issued a Revenue Ruling which states:
"... where periodic payments for support are made by a
husband and received by a wife under a divorce decree or an
instrument or agreement described in section 71 (a), such pay-
ments are includible in the gross income of the wife under
section 71 of the 1954 Code and are deductible by the hus-
band under section 215, except to the extent that the terms
of the decree, instrument, or agreement specifically designate
or 'fix' such payments, or a portion of such payments, as sup-
port for minor children of the husband."11 9
2. Payments Made After Remarriage of Custodial Parent
We are now left with an interesting and perhaps unanswered question.
117 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
118 In affirming the Second Circuit, the United States Supreme Court noted that
the legislative history indicated that the Congress wanted to give the husband and
wife the power to fix the tax burden between themselves. Mr. Justice Douglas
added spice and logic in his concurring opinion, quoting from Mr. Justice Holmes
as follows: "In an early income tax case Mr. Justice Holmes said, 'Men must turn
square corners when they deal with the government.' Rock Island A. & L. R. Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143. The revenue laws have become so complicated
and interrelated that I think the Government in moving against the citizen should
also turn square corners. ... Congress drew a clear line when it used the word
'fix'. Resort to litigation rather than the Congress, for a change in the law is too
often the temptation of government which has a longer purse and more endurance
than any taxpayer."
119 Rev. Rul. 62-53, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 41, rev'g Rev. Rul. 59-93, 1959.1
Cum. BULL. 22.
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Can a husband obtain a deduction for payments made to his ex-wife after
her remarriage if they are not specifically fixed as being for the support
of his children? Suppose, for example, that he must continue to pay a
reduced amount after her remarriage but the amount was not sufficiently
fixed according to Lester to qualify as child support.
State law uniformly provides that upon remarriage of the wife, the
ex-husband has no continuing obligation of support. It seems, therefore,
that if payments are to continue after the wife's remarriage, they are not
alimony under section 71. The Commissioner's ruling, supra, and all the
cases dealing with this issue since Lester would apparently also preclude
such payments from being child support. But what are they? A gift? Sev-
eral cases worth noting have come close to deciding the point, but none
have hit squarely upon it. In Robert E. Dolan, °20 for example, the tax-
payer's wife, who had custody of their two children, did remarry, at which
time the payments were reduced from $200 to $100 per week. Subsequent-
ly, however, she was again divorced and the issue presented to the court
concerned the tax status of payments made after the second divorce. No
mention was made of the lack of any support obligation after the remar-
riage. Dorthy Turkoglu 12 involved the tax status of payments made to
an ex-wife for her own and her children's support. The wife, appearing
pro se, indicated that she was not entitled to alimony under state law.
The Tax Court, however, failed to discuss the point in finding the pay-
ments to be taxable alimony.
3. Modification of Existing Decrees
Divorce courts generally retain continuing jurisdiction over the ali-
mony and custody aspects of a divorce decree. They do so because there
is a continuing public interest in the well-being of the wife and child.
There is little difficulty in obtaining a nunc pro tunc modificaton of a
divorce decree.12 2 If payments for child support were fixed in the first
instance, they can be changed to qualify (as defined by Lester) as ali-
mony. -1 2 3 The character of payments made prior to any modification, how-
ever, cannot be changed by order even if it indicates that the payments
were not "fixed" for child support in the first instance. There is inherent
power in courts of justice to remedy defects or omissions in its records
by nunc pro tunc orders. However, the Revenue Service will not give
retroactive affect to an order to the extent it purports to alter the legal
status of the parties concerned for years gone by.124
120 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 898 (1961).
12136 T.C. 552 (1961).
122 E.g., Michel M. Segal, 36 T.C. 148 (1961); Dorthy Turkoglu, 36 T.C. 552
(1961).
123 Cf. Edna M. Gilbertson, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 563 (1951); Rev. Rul.
58-52, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 29. See also cases cited note 8 supra.
124 Ibid.; but see Margaret Rice Sklar, 21 T.C. 349 (1953) (non acq.); Velma
B. Vargason, 22 T.C. 100 (1954) (non acq.); government appeal withdrawn.
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DBPENDBNCY DEDUCTION
1. Requirements for the Deduction
We have seen that periodic payments marked for the support of the
children are not taxable to the wife. Likewise, payments made, which
qualify as alimony under Section 71 or Section 682, cannot be treated
by the payor as amounts paid for the support of any dependent. There
is, unfortunately, no special provision in the Internal Revenue Code
determining who gets exemption for minor children of divorced parents.
The right to such exemption is governed by the other sections of the Code
which cover dependency exemptions generally.125 To obtain the deduc-
tion, the party who asserts it must show that the claimed dependent is an
individual with the prescribed decree of relationship to him and that the
individual receives one-half of his suport from the taxpayer.126
2. Bearing the Burden of Proof
Showing the required relationship is generally no problem. However,
showing that the support test has been met is another story. Whenever
the non-custodial parent is the one attempting to obtain the exemption,
it is almost impossible to prove that the support requirement has been
met.'27 In cases which have been litigated, the Commissioner prevailed
in the denial of the exemption four out of five times.' 28 At the adminis-
trative level of the Revenue Service (Audit, Appellate, and District Con-
ference), it is likely that the taxpayer is even less successful. The Service
employees at these levels seem to strongly encourage the parties to make
an agreement whereby each will take an equal number of the children.
(It is obviously easier to accomplish this when there are two or four
children than when there are three to one.) If the taxpayers fail to agree
as to how the exemptions should be allocated, there is a marked tendency
to disallow the exemption.12
9
In the usual case, the wife has custody and the husband makes periodic
payments to her for the support of the minor children of the marriage.
The husband usually has little difficulty showing how much he has con-
tributed because he probably made the payments to the court or paid by
125 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5S 151, 152; Treas. Reg. S 1.152-1 (a) (i) and
(i).
128 Ibid.
127 James R. White, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Men. 1137 (1956); Roland H. Wilder,
32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 12 (1963).128 Ascertained by an actual count of the cases litigated in all courts since the
alimony provisions became effective.
129 The dependency exemption itself cannot be divided. Even though the mar-
riage is terminated and household split up, the dependency exemption rests wholly
with the person contributing more than 50 percent of the support required. To
alleviate some of the difficulties, the 1954 Code § 152 (c) introduced the multiple
support agreement. It provides that if no one furnished over one-half of the sup.
port but contributes more than 10 percent and would be entitled to take the de.
pendency exemption if he had, in fact, contributed one-half that parties may join
in a multiple support agreement agreeing that one or the other person gets the
exemption or they get it in alternate years.
(Vol. 3, No. 2
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check or money order. The husband, however, usually must do more than
show how much he contributed. He must show what the total support is. 3°
Once the husband has shown the total support, a determination of
whether or not he contributed more than 50 percent involves only simple'
mathematics. As a practical matter, however, for him to show the amount
of the total support is very difficult, if not in most instances impossible.
The ex-husband has no first-hand knowledge of the cost of the support
of a child with whom he is not living and is, therefore, generally incom-
petent to testify as to total support.131 The ex-wife who has custody will
know what it costs to support the child, but will be an adverse witness.
In addition, personal animosity, and the fact the ex-wife has the deduc-
tion at stake too, (since if husband loses the deduction, the wife will
obtain it and vice versa) will make her even more adverse. Moreover,
even if the taxpayer is willing to take his chances on calling his ex-wife
as an adverse witness (understanding that he will be stuck with her testi-
mony, good or bad), she may live in another state or in another part
of the state and, therefore, not be available in the practical sense. To
procure her testimony under such conditions would be costly as well as
risky, if it could be procured at all. Children who live with the ex-wife
may be competent witnesses if they are old enough and know enough
about the financial dealings of the ex-wife, but this is not the usual case.
The Revenue Service won't help either. To the contrary, they have
issued a Revenue Ruling which provides that the disclosure of informa-
tion furnished the Service by the taxpayer's spouse, relative to amounts
claimed for the support of their children, constitutes a disclosure of con-
fidential matters and is prohibited by Section 7213(a) (1). L32 This is
unrealistic and unfair to the husband. The information he needs to estab-
lish his case may already be in the hands of the Revenue Service or can
be procured by them with little difficulty, yet, they refuse to make it
130 Although in Lillian Mendel, 65-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9698 (4th Cir. 1965) and
E. R. Cobb, Sr., 28 T.C. 595 (1957), the court found that the husband had car-
tied his burden of proof on the "more than half" issue without showing what total
support was. We must proceed cautiously in this area. Recently the Tax Court also
noted that, although the burden of proof is difficult if not impossible to carry, there
is no statutory ground for relieving the taxpayer of his burden. William B. J.
Tibbits, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 726 (1965).
In Joseph I. Genco, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 209 (1965), Judge Kern put it this
way: "The burden of proof is on petitioner and includes not only the burden of
proving the amounts paid . . . for the support of his children but also the total
amount spent for such support." Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547 (1961); Bernard
C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935 (1960). This burden cannot be met by "showing that
someone else is not entitled to the exemption he is claiming." See also Warren
C. Mawhinney, 43 T.C. 443 (1965).131 But see, Commissioner v. Mendel, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9698 (4th Cir.
1965); Markarian v. Commissioner, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9699 (7th Cir. 1965);
Theodore Ml9groom, 31 T.C. 1256 (1959); E. R. Cobb, Sr., 28 T.C. 595 (1957),
where the husband was regarded as competant, to the end that he succeeded in
obtaining the exemptions.
132 Rev. Rul. 58-120, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 498.
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available. If the Revenue Service would disclose the total amount expended
for the suport of the child, many of the cases would not be brought.
Time and again, the Service has indicated its objective is to collect only
the correct tax, no more or no less. It wants the image of the friendly tax
collector. We are told the collection is not an adversary proceeding, yet,
in the divorce setting where there is an opportunity for the Service to
help the taxpayer make a correct determination, it refuses to do so. 133
Another of the difficulties involved in the dependency controversy is
the practical matter of how much tax is involved. In the majority of
cases, there is not enough to justify the substantial legal expenses neces-
sary to prosecute the action. Taxpayers appearing pro se have had little
success in this or any other area of the law. A jury case in the United
States District Court requires payment of the taxes first and entails a
long delay and substantial legal expenses. Chances of success may be
limited even there.
3. Some Signs of Easing the Burden
Prior to Theodore Milgroom,1 34 there was not a single case in which
an ex-husband obtained a dependency deduction without either showing
the actual total costs of suport or that the ex-wife had such a small income
she could not contribute more than one-half the support. In that case
the Commissioner had disallowed exemptions claimed by the divorced
taxpayer for his three children because he "failed to substantiate his claim
to these dependency credits." The Commissioner did not determine that
the taxpayer's children did not receive more than one-half of their sup-
port from him during the tax year. The only testimony adduced at the
trial (which was that of the petitioner, who was an accountant) estab-
lished that the amount contributed by the petitioner for the support of
his children during the year in question was the approximate annual
amount it took to support the children during the two preceding years.
The taxpayer further testified that the standard of living of the children
was no higher than it was in prior years. The court accordingly allowed
the exemptions.
In relying on Milgroom, however, one must be sure to introduce evi-
dence that the standard of living of the former wife and child was the
same as it was in the year about which the petitioner is competent to
testify. In Victor E. Behrens, 135 for example, the taxpayer failed to do so.
He testified as to the total costs of the children's support during 1956.
He further testified as to the amount of support he provided in 1957. His
failure, however, to testify or to introduce evidence relating to the stand-
ard of living of the former wife and child subsequent to the separation
133 See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 689.
13431 T.C. 1256 (1959).
.35 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 759 (1961).
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was fatal to his cause.1 36
The Tax Court will generally not apply the Cohan Rule' 37 in deter-
mining the amount of support furnished.' 38 Similarily, a statement in
the trial court's order or in the property settlement agreement that one
or the other of the parties is entitled to take the minor as a dependent
for tax purposes is not sufficient proof that either is entitled to the
exemption. 39
4. Items of Support
Generally, support includes: Food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental
care, education, necessary child care payments, necessary transportation
and the like.140 The amount of support furnished is equal to the expense
incurred in furnishing the support item or its fair market value.141
Support items are determined with reference to the standard of living
of the parties.142 For example, an automobile might be necessary for some
and not for others.143 Expenses for singing and dramatic lessons might be
items of support for some people.-44 Tuition paid for the attendance of
a child at a private school may or may not be a proper support item.145
With respect to lodging as an item of support, the Service has ruled
that support furnished in the form of lodging is measured in terms of
136 Cf. Aleea Brooks, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 282 (1957). Practitioners have
tried to prove the total amount of support necessary by expert testimony. In James
R. White, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1137 (1956), for example, the taxpayer offered
testimony of experts on child care as to the average cost of support and maintenance
of a child of the same age in the area in the year in question. Though the testi-
mony showed that the average cost of support of such a dependent was less than
twice the amount he contributed, the Tax Court felt he had not carried the burden
of proof. It is difficult to offer an opinion on this point. On the one hand, there
is substantial merit in requiring strict compliance with the literal word of the tax
law, but on the other, one is entitled to be left with some lingering doubt in his
mind about the refusal of the Tax Court to accept evidence offered by qualified
experts. It must certainly be as dear to the Tax Court as it is to everyone else that
the husband has an almost impossible burden to sustain, and one of the ways that he
can sustain it is with the assistance of expert testimony. Rev. Rul. 235 1953-2
CUM. BULL. 23 provides that "in the absence of an actual record of expenses re-
lating to the support of each member of the household, a pro rata portion of the
aggregate of such expenses may be allocated to each member. Fred W. Hertwig,
26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 355 (1957), may help.13 7 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cit. 1930).
13 8 Bernard C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935 (1960).
139 Kennedy v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 335 (7th Cit. 1964); Robert T. John-
son, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 9 (1962).
140 Treas. Regs. 1.152-1 (a) (2) (i) and (ii).
141Ibid.; see also, Bennett H. Darmer, 20 T.C. 822 (1953).
142 See Harriet C. Flowers, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9655 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
143Sid Dyer, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 536 (1955).
14 4 Raymond M. McKay, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960).
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its fair market value.140 At the administrative level of the Revenue Serv-
ice, the tendency is to apportion the value of the lodging on a per capita
basis among those living in the household. This can have devastating
effects as far as the husband obtaining a dependency exemption. To illus-
trate the problem, assume that the wife received the house as part of
the property settlement. She still lives there with the two minor children
of the marriage. Assume the fair rental value of the house to be $175
a month (although the mortgage payments are only $120 a month), and
the utilities are another $35 a month. On a per capita basis, $70 per
month would be allocated to each of the members of the household as
their share of the lodging.
Fortunately, the Tax Court appears willing to allocate on other than
a per capita basis. In Raymond M. McKay,147 for example, the court
found the rental value of the house in which mother and daughter lived
to be $140 per month. Of this, $50 per month was allocated to the
daughter.
DEDUCTIBILITY OF ATroRNEY FEES
1. The Origin and Character Test
Legal fees for services performed in connection with the production of
income, or for services relating to the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of income-producing property, are ordinarily deductible under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 212 (1) and (2). In a di-
vorce or separation proceeding, however, even though the services may
relate to the managemnt, conservation, or maintenance of the taxpayer's
income-producing property, the fees may not be deductible.148 A further
test, best called the "origin and character test", must be satisfied. This
test, established by the United States Supreme Court in the Gilmore v.
United States 1 49 and United States -P. Patrick,0° requires that the fee for
which the deduction is sought arise in connection with work done in the
taxpayer's "profit-seeking activities." It is not sufficient that the tax-
payer's profit-seeking activities be involved; the work done must have
its origin and character therein. The best example is the Gilmore case.
Gilmore had obtained an absolute divorce, without alimony, from his wife.
He also successfully prevented her from obtaining his income-producing
property as part of the property settlement. Deduction of the legal fees
paid for the work necessary to accomplish this was not allowed even
146Emil Blarek, 23 T.C. 1037 (1955); Rev. Rul. 58-302; 1958-1 CuM. BULL.
62. Where there is no evidence as to reasonable rental value, the actual out-of-
pocket expense for providing the lodging may be used. John Malinowsky, 28 P-H
Tax Ct. Mer. 112 (1959); Rev. Rul. 53-235; 1953-2 CriM. BULL 23; Marvin 0.
Tucker, 26 P-H Tax Ct Mer. 413 (1957).
147 34 T.C. 1080 (1960).
1 48 Treas. Regs. § 1.262-1(b) (7).
149290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
150 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
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though the work done was to conserve and maintain the taxpayer's
income-producing property. The Supreme Court reasoned that the deducti-
bility should not turn on the outcome of the litigation (here the suc-
cessful conservation of Gilmore's income-producing property) but, rather,
should depend on the essential origin and character of the claim. Since
Mrs. Gilmore's caims arose as a result of the marital relationship rather
than her ex-husband's business actiivties, the deduction did not have the
right business character and was not allowed.
2. Pre-Origin and Character
Even prior to Gilmore and Patrick, however, taxpayer husbands were
seldom successful in obtaining a deduction for attorney fees. The few
cases in which he was successful are worth noting. Baer v. Commis-
sion,151 for example, allowed a deduction for the part of the legal fee
that the husband paid to his attorney for "services in the negotiations as
to form and amount of alimony." Much like the Gilmore case, Baer's
wife demanded his stock in his controlled corporation. Baer's lawyer,
however, successfully negotiated an agreement whereby he transferred
4,000 shares of the corporate stock to his wife but retained voting power
and the right to direct the ultimate disposition of the shares. In reaching
its conclusion the Eighth Circuit said: "... . (the attorneys' worked out
the plan) by which he was placed in a position to meet these obligations
and yet remain in control of the company and his stock. ... In doing so
they are, we think, conserving and maintaining property held by Baer
for the production of income." 152
The Fifth Circuit in Owens v. Commissioner 15 3 followed Baer and
allowed deduction of the wife's attorney fees paid by the husband because
they were for services rendered in salvaging the business in which the
husband was a partner.
Baer and Owens were not, however, typical of the fortunes of the hus-
in divorce cases.
3. Post Origin and Character Profit-Seeking Activities
In a follow-up decision to the United States Supreme Court decision,
the district court finally gave Gilmore some relief. 54 They allowed him to
capitalize the legal expense he couldn't deduct because it was paid to pro-
tect his stock interest, and "the cost of defending title to property is always
capitalized-that is fundamental in the tax law." 155
It is too early to tell yet what the impact of this district court case may
be, but fundamentally, the court's reasoning appears to be correct.
151 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
152 Id. at 650.
153273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959).
164 Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).155 The district court noted that the Supreme Court had not decided the basic
question when Gilmore was before it They also noted that the large number of
cases, which dealt with tide defense questions, had never applied the "origin and
character test" to legal fees.
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Immediately after Gilmore and Patrick, serious doubt arose about the
deductibility of attorney fees paid by the wife to procure her alimony.
The use of the words "profit-seeking activities" by the court were respon-
sible for the doubt. The unanswered question was: Is alimony a profit-
seeking activity? If not, does the profit-seeking origin and character test
apply?
The Commissioner's regulations, as well as the earlier Tax Court cases
of Elsie B. Gale 156 and Barbara B. LeMond,157 indicated that the deduc-
tion should be allowed. The regulations read:
Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection
with a divorce, separation, or decree for support are not de-
ductible by either the husband or the wife. However, the part
of an attorney's fee and the part of the other costs paid in con-
nection with a divorce, legal separation, written separation
agreement, or a decree for support, which are properly at-
tributable to the production or collection of amounts in-
cludible in gross income under Section 71 are deductible by the
wife under Section 212.158
Subsequently, the Tax Court in Jane U. Elliott ' 5 and Ruth K. Wild,100
interpreted Gilmore and Patrick as not requiring disallowance of attor-
neys' fees paid by the wife to obtain alimony. Although this is a taxpayer
victory, the deduction is usually of little value, since the husband in the
vast majority of cases is ordered to pay the wife's attorney's fees.'"'
4. Deductible as Fees for Tax Advice
Note that in Gilmore and Patrick the Supreme Court was dealing with
the question of deductibility of legal fees under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Section 212 (1) and (2) and not Section 212(3). The
latter section, enacted in 1954, permits an individual to deduct the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses incurred by him in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of any tax. It should be involved in
all divorce cases, but was not in Gilmore and Patrick.
The Revenue Service has sought a restrictive interpretation of Section
212(3) which would allow such deductions only for expenses incurred
for advice or services with respect to completed transactions or where
there was an actual tax controversy. The Service's position is supported
by a House committee report which states:
A new provision added by your Committee allows a deduction
for expenses connected with determination, collection or re-
156 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
157 13 T.C. 670 (1949).
:158STreas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (7).
159 40 T.C. 304 (1963).
160 42 T.C. 706 (1964.
161 See, Spence, Counsel Fees in Matrimonial Actions, 38 NEB. L. REV. 761
(1959).
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fund of any tax liability... Paragraph (3) is new and is de-
signed to permit the deduction by an individual of legal and
other expenses paid or incurred in connection with a contested
tax liability, whether the contest be Federal, state, or municipal
taxes, or whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, and so
forth. Any expenses incurred in contesting any liability collected
as as a tax or as a part of the tax will be deductible.162
Notwithstanding this attempt to limit the deduction under Section
212(3) to fees incurred with respect to completed transactions or actual
tax controversies, two recent decisions in the Court of Claims and one
in the district court of Missouri are quite to the contrary.
In Davis v. United States,163 the Court of Claims allowed a deduction
for attorney fees paid for examining the tax aspects of a proposed separa-
tion and property settlement agreement. They relied on the language
in Treasury Regulations, Section 1.212(1), that expenses paid "for tax
counsel or ...in connection with any proceedings involved in deter-
mining the extent of tax liability.., are deductible." 16,
In Kaufmann v. United States,1 5 the question before the court was the
deductibility of fees paid to an accounting firm in connection with tax
counsel, services, and advice in connection with a proposed plan of reor-
ganization. The court, as in Davis, relied on the wording of Section 212 (3)
and Treasury Regulations, Section 1.212(1), and allowed the deduction
for services performed in examining the tax aspects of the plan of reorga-
nization and in preparing an application for a ruling. The court specifi-
cally rejected the Revenue Service's interpretation of the above-quoted
House committee report as evidence of congressional intent to limit the
deduction under Section 212(3) to completed transactions.
The Court of Claims struck another blow against the Revenue
Services position in Carpenter v. United States.166 There, as in Davis,
the issue before the court was the deductibility of attorney fees paid
for examining the tax aspects of a proposed separation and property
settlement agreement. In holding the deduction allowable under Section
212(3), the Court of Claims merely relied on its decision in Davis,
but it did also note that though Davis had been appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, the question of the deduction under Section
212(3) had not been reviewed.
It should be noted that in Davis, the taxpayer's attorney allocated
a portion of his fee to "tax matters." Presumably, such an allocation
162 H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A59 (1959).
103287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
164 Although the Davis case was appealed, the appeal was brought on another
point, and the Supreme Court specifically refrained from dealing with the §
212(3) question. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
165 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
166 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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will avoid the general rule of Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section
262.
5. Help the Client Get the Deduction -Itemize Your Bill
The attorney, in order to help his divorce client obtain the deduc-
tion, should break down his fee into three components, indicating:
(1) How much he is charging for services which relate to the
preparation of pleadings, obtaining appropriate orders, and
negotiating the custody of children. Fees paid for these
services are not deductible.
(2) How much he is charging for defending title to stock, real
property, or other business assets. It is possible that these
Court decision in Gilmore, may be capitalized.
(3) How much he is charging for looking into the tax aspects of
the proposed separation and property settlement agreement. This
part of the fee should be deductible under the authority of
Davis, Kaufmann and Carpenter.
CONCLUSION - SomE Do's Am DON'TS
Most of the tax problems involved in the divorce and separation
area involve income tax. In fewer cases, some estate tax problems may
be involved. Gift tax problems are mostly all taken care of by either
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 2516 or E.T. 19. Within the
framework of the known problem area, there are some suggestions
which can be made and some real do's and don't with respect to handling
divorce and separation cases from a tax point of view.16 7
1. Periodic Payments versus Principal Sum
Be sure that any principal sum, not intended to be alimony, does
not become inadvertently qualified as a periodic payment because of
contingencies or length of pay out period. It may be good tax planning,
however, to try to qualify principal sums as alimony by making the
payments contingent or providing that the pay out period be more than
ten years. By doing so, it may be possible to shift the tax burden from the
husband, who is usually in the higher tax bracket, to the wife. To take
care of the additional tax, which may be due because of a change
from a principal sum to a periodic payment, parties should consider
increasing the amount by an additional amount equal to the tax which
is estimated to be due.
2. Filing Tax Returns
If possible, the parties should agree to file joint tax returns for the
period prior to the time their divorce is final. Usually the filing of joint
tax returns. will result in a net saving of tax to both parties. If the
167 See, Mills, Tax Check List for Negotiating Divorce and Seperation Agree.
ments, J. TAXATION (1965), for a very excellent short article on tax
considerations attorneys must bear in mind in representing clients in divorce and
seperations.
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husband is to file the return jointly, he may do so by getting the blank
return signed by his wife and a power of attorney to fill in appropriate
information. He should then be required to cover any contingent lia-
bility, which may be visited on the wife because of his filing, by exe-
cuting an indemnity agreement with respect to the return he is about
to file and with respect to any open years which have already been
filed. This indemnity agreement may be put in the separation agreement
as one of the provisions and, subsequently, approved by the court.
If it is in the separation agreement, it is then enforceable by the local
court under its contempt powers. Provision should also be made for the
distribution of any tax refund.
If joint returns are to be filed and the husband and wife are each td
pay part of the tax, a formula by which the amount of tax each is to pay
can be determined. Each should pay only that portion of the tax which
is attributable to his or her income. The following computation will
illustrate the manner in which this can be done:
Wife's tax filing separately ................ $ 3,000
Husband's tax filing separately ................ $ 7,000
Total tax ................................. $10,000
Total tax if husband and wife file jointly ........ $ 8,000
3,000
Wife's share of joint tax: - X 8,000 = $2,400
10,000
7,000
Husband's share of joint tax: - X 8,000 = $5,600
10,000
Total joint tax ......................... .... $8,000
3. Attorney Fees
The attorney should itemize his statement for services rendered. Tax
advice is always deductible. That part of the fee which is attributable
to protecting or acquiring the title to the property may be capitalized.
It is a good idea to try to get the wife to pay her own attorney. If she
does, she may obtain a deduction, while if her husband pays her attorney,
he gets no deduction whatsoever. In order to obtain the tax savings and
yet have the husband, in effect, pay the wife's attorney, alimony may
be increased for a short period of time by such an amount as will equal
the wife's attorney fee. For example, if the wifes attorney's fee is
$600, the alimony payable by the husband can be increased $200 a month
for the first three months of the alimony. This will give the husband an
alimony deduction for the amount he pays and will give the wife a
deduction for attorney fees. The wife's tax position will be unchanged.
However, the husband will gain an additional deduction of $600.
4. Use of Trasts
The best idea is not to use any trusts at all. If one must be used,
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watch out for remainder or reversionary interests which may cause the
corpus of the trust to be included in the husband's taxable estate.
5. Insurance
It is imperative that people dealing in the divorce area understand the
Transfer For Value Rule. It is probably a better idea to have the wife
take out new insurance on the husband's life if he is insurable.
6. Property Settlement
Do not use property with a fair market value less than the basis to
satisfy the property settlement, since the loss will not be allowed. A
better idea is to sell such property to a third party and obtain the loss.
Likewise, do not use appreciated property to satisfy the property settle-
ment unless the taxpayer is prepared to pay capital gains tax.
7. Mortgage Payments
Encumbrances are included in determining the amount received.
If the mortgage payments are intended to qualify as periodic pay-
ments, it may be better to let the wife make them. This way she gets
the deduction, otherwise, if the husband makes the payments, the in-
terest deduction may be lost by both. This may be handled by increas-
ing the alimony in the amount equal to the mortgage payments required.
8. How to Negotiate
Understanding the tax problems involved in divorce and separation
is only half the battle. The more difficult task is finding a reasonable way
to cope with them. Personal animosities and vindictiveness between the
parties often stand in the way of tax savings in a divorce situation. From
the point of view of both parties, it may be best to find out what the
wife wants, come to some conclusion as to what she is to get, and then
allow the husband and his tax advisors to work out the most advantageous
way to provide it.
(EDITOR'S NOTE)
Attorneys in Oklahoma should be aware of a new statute' enacted by
the last Oklahoma Legislature which, if complied with, profoundly affects
the deductibility of Oklahoma alimony payments under Section 215 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 215 provides that a husband
shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible in the gross income
of the wife and deductible by the husband. Section 71(c) (1) provides
alimony payments are to be included in the gross income of the wife.
Such periodic payments are therefore deductible by the husband. "Peri-
odic" means payable over a period of indefinite duration. Thus, a lump
sum payment is not periodic, and is not includible in the gross income
of the wife and deductible by the husband. Section 71(c) (1) provides
that installment payments discharging a part of an obligation the principal
sum of which is specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall
.IOKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 5 1289 (Supp. 1963).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
not be treated as periodic payments. However, Section 71(c) (2) provides
for an exception in cases where such principal sum, by the terms of the
decree, instrument, or agreement, may be or is to be paid over a period
ending more than ten years from the date of such decree, instrument or
agreement. In such cases, the installment payment is considered a peri-
odic payment, but only to the extent that the installment payment or sum
of the installment payments received during the wife's taxable year does
not exceed ten percent of the principal sum.
Th existing alimony statute 2 in Oklahoma provides for a sum of money
payable in gross or in installments. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
construed this statute as providing the wife an allowance in a fixed and
definite sum of money referred to as alimony in gross. In applying the
rule of alimony in gross, the court has held that where the decree pro-
viding for alimony does not fix the amount ultimately to be paid, the
decree is void as to the alimony award. The award of alimony in gross
may be paid in one lump sum or it may be paid in installments if the
total amount to be paid is ascertainable.3 As is readily apparent, an Okla-
homa alimony in gross award payable in a lump sum is never includible
in the gross income of the wife and deductible by the husband, and
Section 71(c) (1) and (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pro-
hibits payments of Oklahoma alimony in gross award payable in install-
ments from being includible in the gross income of the wife, and there-
fore deductible by the husband, unless the principal sum is to be paid
or may be paid over a period ending more than ten years from the date
of such decree, instrument, or agreement.
The new Oklahoma statute reads: "In a divorce decree which provides
for periodic payments of alimony, the court may, in its discretion, declare
that the obligation to pay future installments automatically ceases on the
death or remarriage of the person receiving the alimony."
The Oklahoma legislature apparently lifted the words "periodic pay-
ments" from the statutory language of Section 71 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. We submit that a husband may now deduct payments of
an Oklahoma alimony in gross award payable in installments for ten years
or less if the decree (1) provides for an award of a fixed and definite sum
of money payable in installments, and (2) provides that the obligation to
pay the installments automatically ceases on the death or remarriage of the
wife. This would result in the payments being periodic payments under
Section 71, since the payments would be payable over a period of in-
definite duration due to the contingencies of death or remarriage. Thus,
the payments would be includible in the gross income of the wife and
deductible by the husband.
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, S 1278 (1961).
3 For authorities and further discussion see 3 TULSA LAW JOURNAL 50(1966).
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